Marxism as Philosophical Theology: A Selection from Susan Neiman’s Evil in Modern Thought (2015)

“It’s common enough to describe Marxism as a religion, or to attack it as the god that failed. Like most vulgarizations, this contains a piece of truth. But to acknowledge religious elements in Marx’s view is not to oppose it to philosophy. It’s often suggested that Marxism was born of disappointment with religion’s failure to satisfy human longing for redemption. Philosophy, by contrast, is said to seek truth for truth’s sake alone. It’s further claimed that Marxism is maintained with the tenacity and disregard for evidence that marks religious faith, while philosophy is measured, rational, and responsible to evidence. Some hold that Marx’s territory is close to that of religion, which explains its refusal to cover what philosophy should discuss. In particular, it’s often noted that though Marx’s tone conveys constant moral indignation, he has no moral philosophy in any standard sense—no definitions of right or justice, no attempts to establish moral foundations in general or to argue for the rightness of any action in particular. Thus his fervor is that of the prophet or preacher, not of the moral philosopher.

All these charges take on a different cast if we place Marx where he placed himself, in the thick of attempts to explain evil. Calling it philosophical theology is acceptable as long as you remember that Marx himself was aware that philosophical theology was supposed to be passé. To describe Marxism as the god that failed can be a way of suppressing Marx’s simplest insight, for it implies that Marx’s readiness to substitute human for divine agency was not self-conscious. Then his willingness to assume positions that should be hazarded, at most, within theology, would be a mixture of bravado and oversight. But—to risk the rhetorical inversion of which he was so fond—Marxism can’t be described as the god that failed without first acknowledging Marx’s point: God’s own failure is the starting point for the history of philosophy. . . .

More than anyone other than Nietzsche, Marx perceived the web binding philosophy and theology. . . . Religion, for Marx, includes a great deal: ‘Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedia, its logic in popular form, its spiritualistic point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and the general ground for the consummation and justification of this world. . . . Religious suffering is at once the expression of real suffering and the protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people.’

This is a lot to be said in praise of opium. Religion appears as neither trick nor narcotic but head, heart, and spirit. It is applied philosophy, the live and popular expression of a single human need. He believed it to be the consciousness of transcendence that arises from real necessity. Meaningless suffering is unacceptable, so both philosophy and religion go to work to give it meaning.

Some descriptions of this process sound conspiratorial. Since unexplained suffering threatens to explode established order, those interested in maintaining the order had better find explanations fast. ‘A theodicy justifies the happiness of the powerful and the suffering of the powerless’ . . . .

Like other theodicies, Marx’s justified suffering in the present by showing how it was necessary to overcome suffering in the future. Marx’s praises of capitalism are thus neither ironic nor paradoxical. They are part of a tradition whose goal is to make sense of suffering. Giving meaning to the past and hope to the future is the task of any ground on which religion and philosophy meet. Marx stood as firmly on such ground as anyone. In one respect, however, he broke with every preceding form of theodicy. What others left implicit, half-thought or half-dared, was for Marx as serene as an axiom. Theodicies had hitherto defended God; the point was to replace Him.”—Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (2015)