The Rhetorical Gerrymandering of Violence: A Selection from Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt’s The Coddling of the American Mind (2019)
rhetorical gerrymandering, n. Unilaterally redefining the borders of a word’s meaning to win an argument.
“Most students oppose the use of violence. When asked in a poll conducted by FIRE whether they themselves would use violence to stop someone from speaking, only 1% said yes. But there is a much larger group—roughly 20% to 30%, according to the two surveys we described earlier—that is willing to support other students who use violence . . . . The most common justification is that hate speech is violence, and some students believe it is therefore legitimate to use violence to shut down hate speech. Setting aside the questions of moral and constitutional legitimacy, what are the psychological consequences of thinking this way?
Members of some identity groups surely face more frequent insults to their dignity than do straight white males, on average. A free-for-all attitude toward speech that allows people to say whatever they want with no fear of consequences can therefore affect people with different social identities differently. As we noted . . . some portion of what is commonly called political correctness is just being thoughtful or polite—using words in a way that is considerate to others. But students make a serious mistake when they interpret words—even words spoken with hatred—as violence.
In a widely circulated essay in The New York Times in July 2017, the argument that words can be violence was made by Lisa Feldman Barrett, a well-respected professor of psychology and emotion researcher at Northeastern University. Barrett offered this syllogism: ‘If words can cause stress, and if prolonged stress can cause physical harm, then it seems that speech—at least certain types of speech—can be a form of violence.’
We responded in an essay in The Atlantic, in which we noted that it is a logical error to accept the claim that harm—even physical harm—is the same as violence. Barrett’s syllogism takes the form that if A can cause B and B can cause C, then A can cause C. Therefore, if words can cause stress and stress can cause harm, then words can cause harm, but that does not establish that words are violence. It only establishes that words can result in harm—even physical harm—which we don’t doubt. To see the difference, just rerun the syllogism by swapping in ‘breaking up with your girlfriend’ or ‘giving students a lot of homework.’ Both of these can provoke stress in someone else (including elevated levels of cortisol), and stress can cause harm, so both can cause harm. That doesn’t mean that they are violent acts. . . .
In just the last few years, the word ‘violence’ has expanded on campus and in some radical political communities beyond campus to cover a multitude of nonviolent actions, including speech that this political faction claims will have a negative impact on members of protected identity groups.
Outside of cultures of safetyism, the word ‘violence’ refers to physical violence. The word is sometimes used metaphorically (as in ‘I violently disagree’), but few of us, including those who claim that speech is violence, have any difficulty understanding the statement ‘We should reduce incarceration for nonviolent offenses.’ However, now that some students, professors, and activists are labeling their opponents’ words as violence, they give themselves permission to engage in ideologically motivated physical violence.”—Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas are Setting Up a Generation for Failure (2019)
